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Abstract 
Research on the history of inequality in pre-industrial economies has focused 
mainly on either wealth or income inequality. The most common problem with wealth 
inequality is the lack information about the bottom of the distribution while the main 
problem with income inequality is the lack of data to characterize the top of the 
distribution. Given that in general these approaches are based in different kinds of 
sources and methodologies, the results are not easy to compare and the links between 
the two distributions are difficult to establish. In this paper we use a unique data set 
for different regions of Spain circa 1750 and present results (the first for any pre-20th 
century economy) of inequality of both income and wealth for the same sample of 
households. Information of wealth comes from probate inventories while information 
of income comes from the Ensenada Cadastre. The main results of the paper are that 
poor households are not completely absent from our data set of inventories, that the 
position of a household in the distribution of income is closely associated to its 
position in the distribution of wealth and that an increase of a household’s wealth is 
associated to a less-than-proportional increase in the household’s income.  
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Comparing Income and Wealth Inequality in Pre-Industrial economies.  
Lessons from Spain in the 18th century 
1. Introduction 
The significant increase in global income inequality in the last two hundred years is 
one of the most important features of the modern process of economic growth 
(Bourguignon and Morrison 2002, Van Zanden et al. 2014). One of the main hypotheses 
about the evolution of income inequality in Europe in the three hundred years before the 
Industrial Revolution is that there was a divergence of real wages across countries which is 
consistent with an increase in across country inequality (Allen 2001). Regarding inequality 
within countries, the evidence is mixed suggesting that inequality increased in some 
countries like Holland and Italy (Van Zanden 1995 and Alfani 2010 and 2014) while 
decreased in Portugal (Reis et al. 2012) or oscillated without a clear trend in Spain (Álvarez-
Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013).  Some of the estimations of economic inequality 
mentioned in this debate have used income as the relevant variable while others have used 
wealth.  
One of the most usual approaches to measure income inequality in pre-industrial 
times have been to look at social tables in which population is divided into groups based 
on occupations and/or social classes and an average income is assigned to each group; in 
these cases, income is usually defined following indirect information from 
contemporaneous observers (Williamson and Lindert 1980, Milanovic, Lindert and 
Williamson 2007 and 2011).1 This way of assessing households’ income is relatively 
straightforward for the bottom part of the distribution because most of income comes 
from labor, occupations are relatively homogenous and workers’ income is easy to infer. 
However, in the top part of the distribution there are many sources of income and 
occupations are quite idiosyncratic; hence, inferring incomes of more affluent households 
from an occupation or social class is subject to a wide margin of error.  
Research on wealth inequality before the 20th century has mainly relied on data sets 
based on tax records (for instance, Soltow and Van Zanden 1998 and Alfani 2010) or 
collections of probate inventories (for instance, Hanson Jones 1978, McCants 2006 and 
Canbakal 2013). One limitation of these sources to measure wealth inequality is that in 
general the poorer segments of the society are underrepresented leading to an important 
                                                 
1 The historical evolution of top incomes has also been scrutinized trough tax records (for instance, Atkinson, 
Pikkety and Saez 2009). 
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selection bias.2 Some attempts have been made to calculate the level of underrepresentation 
of some population sub-groups and assess the implied selection bias for Colonial America 
(Jones 1978, Scott Smith 1975, Main 1974).  
In this paper we present a new data set to calculate economic inequality in Spain 
using information from Palencia, Madrid, Guadalajara and Granada, circa 1750. This data 
set has some unique characteristics. In the first place we combine information from two 
different sources: probate inventories that contain a detailed description of households’ 
wealth and a fiscal source –the Ensenada Cadaster- that provides information about 
households’ income. Secondly, we have been able to link the households included in our 
set of inventories with their corresponding records in the Cadaster, opening the possibility 
to analyze the relationship between the income of a household when the Cadaster was 
produced and the wealth of the same household some years later when the head of the 
household passed away. Thirdly, given that the coverage of the Cadaster was basically 
complete, we can use the income distribution provided by this source to determine the 
magnitude of over (or under) representation of the different parts of the distribution in the 
set of inventories; a byproduct of this analysis is the possibility to weight the observations 
in the set of inventories in order to reduce the problem of selection bias. 
The main goal of this paper is to provide a methodological contribution linking the 
distribution of income and the distribution and wealth and providing some hypotheses to 
understand the differences between them. Our results confirm that the set of surviving 
inventories is strongly biased towards the upward part of the distribution but in the three 
regions in our data set there are some inventories from the poorest quintile of the 
population showing that the poor are not completely absent from probate inventories. 
Even though the information of wealth and income come from completely independent 
sources, the association between the two variables is remarkable suggesting that they 
capture quite well some underlying dimension of economic affluence. A simple 
econometric estimation of the relationship between the two variables suggests that across 
households wealth increase more than income (i.e. wealth elasticity of income is smaller 
than one) and households whose head work in the secondary and tertiary sectors have 
larger incomes than the ones predicted by their wealth. 
                                                 
2 Soltow and van Zanden (1998, p. 20) warn that “wealth statistics generally are quite deficient in telling us 
anything about the condition of people below median income”. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce a discussion 
of previous estimations of economic inequality; in section 3 we describe the historical 
context of Spanish Economy. In section 4 we present the data. Section 5 summarizes the 
main results and finally section 6 suggests some conclusions. 
2. The estimation of income and wealth inequality before household 
surveys 
The estimation of economic inequality before the 20th century has to be based on 
information collected for other purposes than inequality analyses. The three most usual 
approaches used in the field are the construction of social tables, the exploration of tax 
records and the analysis of probate inventories.3 The so called “social tables” are based on 
dividing the population (or the subset of income earners) in groups (usually associated to 
an occupation or social status) and assigning an average income to each group. Under the 
assumption that most of inequality stems from the differences across groups rather than 
distances within the group, this methodology is similar in spirit to what is done with 
modern data sets when the population is divided in quintiles.4 Once the profile of incomes 
for the population is constructed in this way, standard measures of inequality can be 
calculated (Lindert and Williamson 1980; Milanovic, Williamson and Lindert, 2007 and 
2011; Bertola et al. 2009).5 
Tax records are another important source to estimate inequality given that wealth 
and income are two variables which have emerged very naturally as tax bases in many 
historical contexts. An already classical example of these approaches can be found in the 
studies of the Florentine Catasto by Herlihy (1975) and Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985) 
which registered households’ wealth. More recently Alfani (2010) explores wealth inequality 
in Ivrea in the 16th and 17th centuries based on the records of estimi, a tax on the value of 
                                                 
3 Williamson (2002) has suggested that the ratio between average land rent and average unskilled wages can be 
used as a proxy for economic inequality given that rents from land are usually part of the income of the 
households in the top of the distribution while income from labor is more important for households in the 
bottom of the distribution. Other authors have modified this idea using per capita GDP instead of land rents 
(Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Dobado and García Montero, 2010). 
4 In modern data sets, households are ordered according to their income and therefore, by definition, the 
quintiles or deciles are non-overlapping sub-groups. In social tables the richest households of a group can be 
richer than the poorest households of the next group. Modalsli (2015) analyses the impact of this 
characteristics of the social tables in standards measures of inequality like the Gini coefficient. 
5 Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007) calculate Gini coefficients with social tables for 14 pre-industrial 
societies; they include Old Castile in 1752 looking at groups of households with similar income and taking the 
information from the Ensenada Cadastre as summarized in Ramos Palencia (2010). The Gini coefficients they 
found for Modern Europe range from 44.9 in England and Wales in 1688 to 63.0 in Holland in 1732 and Old 
Castile is in the middle of this range with a Gini of 52.3. 
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real estate owned by households. Other approaches are based on other kinds of fiscal 
records: Soltow and, Soltow and Van Zanden (1998) use the introduction of an income tax 
in 1749 in the States of Overijssel to analyze inequality in pre-industrial Holland while 
Santiago Caballero (2011) uses the tithe paid by each grain producer as a proxy for income 
and from that information he deduces the inequality in Guadalajara, Spain, during the 18th 
century. Nicolini and Ramos Palencia (2015) use a sample of the Ensenada Cadastre in the 
province in Palencia collected with the purpose of transforming the fiscal system in Old 
Castile and providing information not only of households’ incomes but also a detail of the 
different sources of income (mainly land, livestock an labor). Sometimes, this kind of 
sources is far from perfect and it is quite common that taxes were calculated based only on 
a sub-set of the assets of the households (usually land or real estate) or on a specific activity 
or kind of consumption which eventually was linked to households’ income.6 
Other important sources for the analysis of economic inequality in the past are the 
numerous collections of probate inventories scattered across the world.7 Although PIs 
provide extremely rich and detailed descriptions of the wealth of many households in the 
past, their suitability for studying inequality is not obvious given the problem of selection 
biases (Lindert 1981, Hanson Jones 1982). Two biases are commonly identified: first, the 
age distribution of the deceased head of households is in general different from the age 
distribution of all head of households. Second, richer households are usually over-
represented within the survival inventories. A recommended strategy to deal with selection 
bias is to construct weights or multipliers to correct the bias and that would be the 
approach in this paper.8  
3. Historical context 
 
                                                 
6 Soltow and van Zanden (1998, p. 26) analyze income inequality in the 16th century in Holland, using, as a 
proxy for households’ income, the tiende penning (the tenth penny) a tax based on the rentable value of 
houses. Another example is Alfani (2010) who uses the value of real estate as a proxy for total wealth in Ivrea 
(Italy) in the Early Modern period.  
7 Hanson Jones (1980, 1982) uses the available PIs to estimate aggregate wealth and wealth distribution of the 
American Colonies in the second half of the 18th century; Lindert (1981) analyzes wealth inequality in 
England between 1670 and the 20th century; McCants (2007) uses probate inventories to asses living 
conditions of middling and poor households in 18th century Amsterdam while Canbakal (2013) uses a very 
extensive set of probate inventories to analyze the long run evolution of inequality in the Ottoman Empire 
between the 16th and the 19th century.  
8 Lindert (1981, p. 660) says that “…to derive such multipliers, we need either (a) true wealth distributions for 
benchmark periods and places or (b) data on other attributes of the probated individuals, primarily attributes 
linked strongly to their wealth and available for the entire population of adults or household heads.” As we 
will see in Section 4, our weights will be elaborated using income as an attribute linked to wealth.  
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The period between 16th and 18th century in Europe is characterized by a process of 
widening distances in income per capita between a group of leading regions (England and 
Holland) and another group of regions with small or zero growth rates. This process has 
been called the small divergence (Allen 2001) and generated an increase in across country 
inequality.9 In this small divergence, Spain was an example of relative retardation and 
between the 16 and the 18th centuries fall clearly behind the European leaders (Álvarez-
Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2007, 2013).  
Our knowledge of the evolution of economic inequality within countries or regions in 
this period has expanded considerably in the last years. After the seminal paper by Van 
Zanden (1995), in which an increase in both income and wealth inequality has been 
documented for Holland and a positive association between economic inequality and 
economic growth and urbanization has been suggested for Europe, other researches have 
added new pieces of evidence for other countries. Alfani (2010) claims that wealth 
inequality in the North of Italy increased in the Early Modern times even though income 
per capita stagnated; in the Low Countries (Flanders, Brabant and Holland), Ryckbosch 
(2016) finds growth in economic inequality in the two centuries prior to the Industrial 
Revolution. Reis et al. (2012) suggest that income inequality do not increase in a Portuguese 
economy stagnates from 1550 to 1700. In the Ottoman Empire, Ergene et al. (2013) show 
declining inequality and economic stagnation during the eighteenth century. In addition, 
Canbakal (2013) finds inequality tended to be smaller in rural areas than in urban 
agglomerations. For Spain there are estimations by Santiago Caballero (2011) using tithe 
data as a proxy for income that suggest that inequality stable during the 18th century in 
central Castile and by Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) that, using the ratio 
between per capita income and unskilled wages, claim that -except for the early seventeenth 
century- inequality decreased (increased) in periods of economic depression (expansion).  
Even though the economic evolution of Modern Spain is characterized in general terms 
by a process of relative retardation, the eighteenth century is one of changes in almost in 
every aspect with a positive final balance: demographic growth, economic expansion, 
administrative reforms in the colonies and greater international presence and increasing 
geopolitical relevance. There were all the same a series of shadows and light that we need 
to bear in mind. The vacant throne of the Spanish monarchy triggered an international war 
- The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) which pitted France against England, the 
                                                 
9 Milanovic (2005) presents the concepts of global inequality and international inequality. 
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Netherlands and Austria. The war saw the beginning of British global hegemony and the 
arrival of the French Bourbons in Spain. When the conflict had ended, Phillip V (1700-
1746) set out to emulate France by pushing for economic unification and political 
centralization, with mixed results. First of all, the diverse coinage in circulation in the 
different territories were withdrawn and replaced by a single currency (following the system 
in place in Castile). However, fiscal union was not achieved. The “Nueva Planta” Decrees 
abolished the remaining “fueros” (local privileges and laws) of the Crown of Aragon 
(encompassing Aragon itself as well as Catalonia and Valencia) given that they had mostly 
supported the opposing side to the Bourbons during the War of the Spanish Succession. At 
the same time, a single tax (the “Equivalente”) was imposed in the form of a quota levied on 
rural and urban properties and the profits deriving from trade, industry and labour.10 
Conversely, the fiscal prerogatives and exemptions of the Basque Country and Navarre 
were preserved.  In Castile, the fiscal reform advocated by the Marquis de Ensenada and 
inspired by the one applied in the Crown of Aragon was a failure. In 1749, Fernando VI 
decided to divide the kingdom into provinces. In charge of each provincial capital would be 
a corregidor, which later became the intendente of the province. This intendente was the royal 
official in charge of tax collection in the province.  
From the economic point of view, Herr (p. 128) highlights the fact that “one could 
draw a geographical line that separated the North and East - where industry11 was thriving 
and the farmers were well-off - from the Centre and South, where industry was backward 
and the farmers and day labourers in the countryside were exploited by the rural 
oligarchy12”. With the exception of Madrid and its over 150,000 inhabitants (c. 1790) the 
                                                 
10 According to Ferrer Alós (2002, pp. 29-32) the intention was to create a single tax calculated on the basis of 
personal wealth, which was derived from the land and from labour. However, the Bourbon bureaucracy, for 
logistical reasons, opted for a quota system. This meant that a more or less fixed amount was set and this was 
divided among the localities on the basis of the reports gathered in each of them. 
11 In an effort to stimulate industry and pay for the high internal transportation costs, the Bourbon 
mercantilist system opted for increasing duties on foreign imports and eliminating the monopoly of Seville 
and Cadiz in trade with the Latin American colonies. This last measure was immensely beneficial to the 
merchant navy and to manufacturing industry in Catalonia (paper and cotton), in Valencia (silk, linen fabrics 
and tiles) and also in the Basque Country (iron and steel). In the interior, meanwhile, official policy was to 
support manufacturing with subsidies (for example, the textile products of Guadalajara) to compete with the 
luxury goods that were being imported from abroad.  For its part, industries that produced essential goods 
were dominated by the Guilds; institutions that seem to have monopolized all industrial activity in the cities 
(with the exception of Catalonia) and of which the Bourbon politicians were highly critical.  
12 Although, according to the 1797 census, 22% of the people employed in agriculture were landowners, there 
were marked disparities from an imaginary line which extended from the north-east (Salamanca) to the south-
east (Albacete). Thus, for instance, in the north - Aragon, Navarre, Biscayan and Galicia – landowners 
accounted for one half of the total, whereas in Andalusia the figure oscillated from 3 to 7%.  Land ownership 
was distributed by order of importance among private owners whose lands were “tied” and could not be sold 
(mayorazgos which were tied to a particular family and señoríos, landed estates which were a royal privilege 
granted to the nobility and wealthy commoners); the towns and cities (commonweals that were a crucial 
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large cities were all located near the sea. The populations of Barcelona (Catalonia) and 
Valencia (Valencia province) rose to 100,000 inhabitants by the end of the 18th century.  In 
the south, the provinces of Andalusia stood out, with the cities of Cadiz (over 10,000 
inhabitants), Seville and Granada (80,000 each) and Malaga, with 50,000.  In contrast, there 
was not a single city in Castile with a population of over 25.000. Based on the information 
provided by the Ensenada Cadastre and re-compiled by Matilla (1947), the provinces of the 
former Crown of Castile with the highest per capita income were Madrid (1,453 reales), 
Seville (641 reales) and Guadalajara (601 reales). In contrast, the provinces with the lowest 
per capita income were Granada (322 reales), Leon-Asturias (278 reales) and Galicia (202 
reales). The average per capita income in Castile was in the region of 433 reales.13 
In this article, we have chosen from North to South three provinces: Palencia, 
Guadalajara city and some small towns of Madrid, and Granada. Palencia -situated in the 
north of Spain- had a population of about 106,440 inhabitants distributed in the following 
comarcas: El Cerrato Palentino, Tierra de Campos (the city of Palencia belongs to this 
comarca), Saldaña-Valdavia, Boedo and La Ojeda Valley, Aguilar and Guardo-Cervera. In the 
second half of the eighteenth century the population of the province of Palencia was 
distributed irregularly, concentrating more than two thirds of the population in the 
southern: Tierra de Campos and El Cerrato Palentino. In these regions there were relatively 
large population centers, over a hundred neighbors, but geographically distant from each 
other. In Southern Palencia wheat production stood out, while the rest (wine, vegetables, 
etc.) played a secondary role, and also the livestock was limited to animals for agricultural 
work or for peddlers. Larruga wrote that Palencia was the “most industrious province of 
Castile”. In fact, the comarcas of Tierra de Campos and El Cerrato Palentino had quite 
important secondary and tertiary sectors. In Northern Palencia (Guardo-Cervera and 
Aguilar), population density was quite low and the population was concentrated in a many 
small nuclei, very close to each other. These areas were characterized by livestock activities, 
linen production and mule drivers. Low quality textile industry (domestic production) was 
                                                                                                                                               
source of revenue for the town and city councils); the Church; the Crown; and among private landowners 
with land that was not tied up in some way.  It should be noted that only too often the landowner was the 
owner of a house and small piece of land. Furthermore, he or she might live on an estate to which rent had to 
be paid.  In practical terms, the great aristocratic oligarchy was made up of the hidalgos and the urban super-
rich.  Indeed, in both provinces of Castile, in Extremadura and Western Andalusia and in Valencia, more than 
half of the towns paid tribute to landlords.  For more details, see Herr (pp. 28-29). 
13 This is the author’s own analysis based on the data provided by Matilla (1947, appendices) and the number 
of inhabitants in 1752 provided by the 75 Group (1977, p. 64). To work out the total income in each 
province, we have included the income generated both by the lay sector and the Church from rural 
properties, urban properties, livestock, ground rent and other forms of rent, interest on loans and all of the 
other revenue derived from industrial, commercial activities and personal work.  
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of great importance in the valleys of Boedo and La Ojeda. The most populated towns 
according to Ensenada Cadastre (1759) were: Palencia (9,639 inhabitants) and Paredes de 
Nava (3,395) both from Tierra de Campos.14 
The areas (comarcas) from the center of Castile analyzed in this paper are Las Vegas, very 
close to Madrid City, and Guadalajara City. With the exception of Guadalajara City, the 
economy was predominantly agro-pastoral producing mainly cereals, vegetables, oil, wine, linen, 
silk, fruit and also sheep, goats, cattle and pigs. The city of Guadalajara (5,218 inhabitants) 
was an important industrial nucleus during the 18th century because the Bourbons 
established the Real Fábrica de Paños (the former Royal Cloth Mills) in 1719. This company 
was characterized by state ownership, organization of production around guilds, 
competitive markets, and finally recruitment of foreign experts (La Force, 1964). 
Unfortunately the company began to decline during the 1790s due to the crisis of the 
Ancien Régime. The process speeded up during the Napoleonic Wars and finished with the 
closure of the company in 1822. The next most populated towns were Colmenar de Oreja 
(1,279 neighbors) and Chinchón (1,217 neighbors). 
Finally in Granada we have studied two areas: Lecrín Valley in the southwest and Baza 
in the northeast. Lecrín Valley (2,398 neighbours, approximately 9,484 inhabitants) was 
basically an agricultural economy.15 The most populated town was Albuñuelas (294 
neighbours) and Pinos (260). Baza is the largest area (greater than 1,700 km2) of the 
province of Granada. There are three main zones: the Sierra of Baza, the Meseta and the 
Vega. The Meseta and the Vega are flat plains surrounding the city of Baza, mainly 
dedicated to agricultural uses. The Sierra of Baza is a rocky massif with deep valleys and 
escarpments. According to Ensenada Cadastre, Baza had a population of around 5,366 
neighbors (approximately greater than 20,000 inhabitants). The largest towns were Baza 
(1,610 neighbors) and Las Cuevas (1,302 neighbors).  
 
                                                 
14 See Marcos (1985, p. 22) and Camarero Bullón (1990, pp. 231-249).  
15 Many households earned some income apart from the one associated to the main job of the head of the 
household. Some of them were engaged in the manufacture and sale of “pleita” (ring or strip of straw twisted 
in several branches, sewn “pleita” was used to make mats, hats, pouches, etc.) and others were salesmen, mule 
drivers and peddlers, who provided a link between the very poor villages from these areas and Granada city.  
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FIGURE 1 












 Urban areas:   
Guadalajara city 151 Guadalajara 
Palencia city n.a. Palencia 
• Rural areas (Comarcas):   
Aguilar 476 Palencia 
Lecrín Valley 461 Granada 
Baza 1,732 Granada 
Boedo and Ojeda Valleys 613 Palencia 
Cerrato 1,389 Palencia 
Cervera 858 Palencia 
Las Vegas (excluded Aranjuez) 1,189 Madrid 
Saldaña-Valdavia 347 Palencia 






























GUADALAJARA: CENTER of SPAIN
Guadalajara city
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4. The data 
Two different data sets are used in this paper. The first one includes information 
contained in 194 probate inventories (PIs hereafter) and the second one is composed by 
more than 6,000 records on household characteristics from the Ensenada Cadaster from 
the same areas than the inventories. These areas are situated in the current provinces of 
Palencia (north), Guadalajara (center), Madrid (center) and Granada (south).  
FIGURE 2 
SPAIN, CIRCA 1750  
(GUADALAJARA, GRANADA, MADRID AND PALENCIA FROM FORMER 




A probate inventory is a comprehensive list of all the goods owned by the deceased 
at the moment of his/her death and it was usually elaborated by a notary or judicial 
authority a few days after the person passed away. Although there is some variability in the 
structure, the format and the style of the inventories, it is possible to summarize the 
structure of a Castilian post-mortem inventory, from the middle of the 18th Century. The 
rich description given in the post-mortem inventories remained in Castile until around the 
middle of the 19th century. After this date, the descriptions of durable and semi-durable 












progressively disappeared, their total value becoming an increasingly smaller percentage in 
relation to the total inventoried assets. 16 
The Ensenada Cadastre (EC hereafter) is a census carried on in the middle of the 
18th century with the purpose to improve the fiscal organization of the Spanish monarchy.17 
The purpose of the Marquis of La Ensenada (Secretary of the Treasury between 1743 and 
1754) was to establish a single tax (Única Contribución) -universal and proportional to the 
income of the taxpayers-, which would replace other taxes collected from the provinces 
(Rentas Provinciales). The “Alcabalas”, “Hundreds” (Cientos) and “Millions” (Millones), among 
others, were indirect taxes and they were supposed to have a regressive impact on the 
overall distribution of income in the economy (Comín and Yun, 2015). The tax reform 
planned by Ensenada proposed the direct taxation, the recovery of income previously 
transferred, the option of eliminating tax exemptions (especially in the ecclesiastical 
institutions) and the development of a simplified tax system. The downfall of Ensenada by 
pressure from the British lobby of the Court in 1754 -because of his sympathy towards 
France in The Seven Years’ War, 1756-63- tax reform greatly reduced the political support 
for the tax reform which was never implemented  but generated a huge amount of detailed 
information about the Spanish economy in that period. The Cadastre, which covered the 
former Crown of Castile (see Figure 2) was carried out approximately between 1749 and 
1759 and is a very good source for studying economic activities in general and economic 
inequality in particular because it collected a detailed accounting of the income of each 
household in each locality in Old Castile and incorporated an analysis of incomes of usually 
exempted social groups like the members of the church and the nobility. 18 
The probate inventories in our data set are all the available inventories between the 
years 1753 and 1768 from 11 geographic units (each geographic unit will be called GU 
hereafter) in three different regions of Castile.19 The geographic coverage of this data set is 
the result of two motivations: initially we collected all the available inventories in the 
province of Palencia to analyze several economic topics in that province. There were 116 
inventories from 7 different GUs (Palencia City, Boedo and Ojeda Valleys, Cerrato, 
                                                 
16 See a summary and historiographical references on the characteristics of probate inventories as historical 
sources in Old Castile in Nicolini and Ramos (2010, p. 153-155). 
17 Ruiz Torres (2008, p. 280-285.) 
18 See Nicolini and Ramos Palencia (2015) for a detailed description of the EC as a source for studying 
income inequality.  
19 The great challenge -and at the same time one of the major difficulties of this research- is to find probate 
inventories whose heads of household are included in the Ensenada Cadastre. Unfortunately it is not an easy 
task mainly because only a limited number of probate inventories in each locality have come down to us in 
the archives. 
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Guardo-Cervera, Saldaña Tierra de Campos and Aguilar). Afterwards, we incorporated two 
other regions, one in the Centre of Old Castile (close to the city of Madrid) and another 
one in the South (in the province of Granada) in order to (i) expand the number of 
observations and the geographical coverage of the first data set and (ii) to incorporate into 
the analysis localities with a productive profile different to the one observed in Palencia. In 
these two cases, we selected two GUs in each region (Guadalajara City and Las Vegas in 
the Centre and Baza and Lecrín Valley in Granada) and collected all the available 
inventories in each of these four geographic units: 50 inventories in the Centre and 30 
inventories in Granada. These makes the 194 PIs that we included in our Data Set 1 (DS1 
hereafter). 20 
A very important difference between the 116 inventories in Palencia and the 78 
inventories in the Centre and Granada is that in Palencia we have a full coverage of the 
available inventories in the Province and we have inventories for all the six natural 
traditional demarcations in the province. In each of the other two regions we have 
collected all the available PIs from two GUs but these GUs are not necessarily 
representative of the whole province (see the maps in figure 1).  
To complete DS1 we have linked the name of the deceased person in each PI to 
the corresponding record in the EC; in this way we produced information for each 
household on -among other things- total wealth at the moment of the death of the head of 
the household (from PI) and the total income of the household as recorded by the EC 
some years before. 
                                                 
20 We have collected exactly 194 probate inventories from 43 cities, towns and villages in 11 GUs 
alphabetically ordered (in parenthesis, name of the town and number). Aguilar, 17 probate inventories 
(Aguilar (3), Bascones de Valdavia, Cordovilla, Corvio, Foldada, Matamorisca, Orbo, Quintanilla de las 
Torres, Respenda, Revilla de Santullán, San Martín de Perapertú, Valle Espinoso and Villabellaco (3)). Baza, 
16 probate inventories (Baza (6) and Cúllar Baza (10)). Boedo and Ojeda Valleys, 10 probate inventories 
(Prádanos de Ojeda (6) and Villabermudo (4)). Cerrato, 12 probate inventories (Cevico de la Torre (8), 
Hontoria de Cerrato (3) and Soto de Cerrato (1)). Cervera, 21 probate inventories (Barcenilla, Campo, Celada, 
Cervera (2), Estalaya, Herreruela, Lores, Muda, Resoba (2), Rueda (3), San Cebrián de Muda (1), San Martín 
de los Herreros (1), Triollo (3), Verdeña (2)). Guadalajara city, 12 probate inventories. Las Vegas, 37 probate 
inventories (Carabaña (12), Colmenar de Oreja (2), Orusco (5) and Valdaracete (18))). Lecrín Valley, 13 
probate inventories (Padul (13)). Palencia city, 24 probate inventories. Tierra de Campos, 32 probate inventories 
(Paredes de Nava (16) and Villarramiel (16)). 
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TABLE 1 
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND WEIGHTS IN THE SOURCE DATA SET 













Average size of 
city or towns in 
sample 
Freq 
• Aguilar Palencia 7,168 68 26 1,795 17 Valberzoso and 
Villabellaco 
62 31 29 
• Baza Granada 20,918 8 648 5,366 16 Cúllar Baza 678 678 8 
• Boedo and Ojeda 
Valleys 
Palencia 9,484 45 53 2,385 10 Villabermudo 77 77 31 
• Cerrato Palencia 19,372 41 105 4,313 12 Cevico Navero 
and Hontoria  
201 101 21 
• Guadalajara city Guadalajara 5,238 1 1,333 1,333 12 Guadalajara city 1,301 1,301 1 
• Guardo-Cervera Palencia 11,000 49 48 2,372 21 Resoba 63 63 38 
• Las Vegas  
(excl. Aranjuez) 
Madrid 23,904 22 284 6,401 37 Carabaña 182 182 35 
• Lecrín Valley Granada 9,484 17 139 2,398 13 El Padul 258 258 9 
• Palencia city Palencia 9,639 1 2,374 2,374 24 Palencia city 2,259 2,259 1 
• Saldaña Palencia 3,652 29 36 1,044 0 Bustillo de la 
Vega 
34 34 31 
• Tierra Campos 
(excl. Palencia city) 
Palencia 45,869 75 150 11,220 32 Paredes and 
Villarramiel 
1,099 550 10 
           
TOTAL Data Set  165,728 356 5,196 41,001 194    6,214    
TOTAL CASTILE  6,570,499   1,685,832      
Notes: Values reported in the third data column for the province of Palencia are from Marcos Martín (1985, pp. 21–29); for the rest of the provinces, authors’s calculations from the EC; the data for 
total Castile (inhabitants c. 1752) are from Grupo 75 (1977, p. 64). The size of the listed towns differs from their size in our data set because the number of household heads included in the Libros de 
Cabeza de Familia need not coincide with the quantity of households included in Libros de Hacienda, which is our source for information on individual households. The reason is that widows are counted 
as 0.5 and also (and mainly) because the Libros de Hacienda includes anyone—not always a head of household—who derived income from any kind of property and/or employment. 
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The number of observations in DS1 is 194 and the geographic distribution of these 
observations is described in column 7 of Table 1. The main variables coming from the PI 
in our DS1 are as follows:  
• Wealth: the sum of real estate assets (total of urban and rural properties), financial 
assets (cash, credits, debts, land rents, expenditures for the funeral service and 
shares of the estate received by the inheritors in advance), capital assets 
(implements and tools -farming implements, winemaking and measuring 
equipment, implements for livestock and for producing textiles-, raw textiles and 
livestock) and durable or semi-durable consumption goods (all types of clothes, bed 
linen, table linen, personal items, articles related to household equipment -kitchen 
and furniture-, pictures, books, and jewellery). More details in Nicolini and Ramos 
(2010).  
• Year: from 1753 to 1768. 
In addition to these variables, DS1 also has the information provided by the EC for 
these 194 households.  
It is well known that the households described by the surviving PIs available in 
archives are usually a biased selection of total households of the underlying population: 
households with high income or wealth are over-represented in the sample of PIs. In order 
to have an approximation of the whole distribution of households in each of the 11 GUs 
we have selected one (or two) towns in each GU and recorded all the relevant information 
provided by the EC for every household in those towns; this information is systematized in 
our Data Set 2 (DS2) and involves 6,214 households. In this way, we have been able to 
generate an approximation of the whole distribution of income for each GU. In Table 1 we 
show the basic information behind this process of reconstructing the income distribution 
in each GU. In the first three columns we present the 11 GUs included in our data sets, the 
provinces in which each of them is located and the population of the province. Columns 4 
to 6 show the number of towns in each province, the average number of households in 
each town and total number of households in the corresponding GU. Column 7 reports 
the number of PI in each locality while columns 8 and 9 show the towns included in our 
DS2 in each GU and the quantity of households in each town. 
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All the information in DS2 set comes from the EC and the main variables used in 
this paper are as follows:  
• Income: It is measured in reales. It includes income derived from land; buildings and 
non-land properties (e.g., houses in the cities and mills in the countryside); 
livestock; taxes, fees, credits and/or debts; and finally, personal earnings. This last 
part includes labour income of the main activity of the household head (this 
income is imputed by census officials and assuming a daily income and a certain 
number of days per year: 120 days for agricultural labourers, 180 days for workers 
in secondary and tertiary sectors, and 360 days for shepherds); additional income 
obtained from trade associated with the main job or with other activity (e.g. 
shoemaker is also in charge of the distribution of brandy); labour income from a 
second occupation; and income derived from agro-pastoral activities on land that is 
rented from others. More details in Nicolini and Ramos (2015). 
• Urban: it is a dummy variable with value 1 if the household is in the cities of 
Palencia and Guadalajara and 0 otherwise. 
• Economic Sector: we have distinguished the economic sector at which the head of 
the household performs his or her activity. 21 
5. Estimation and Results 
An unusual characteristic of our data sets is the coexistence of a set of all the 
available inventories in a given area and a representative set of all the household incomes in 
that area.22 This characteristic opens the possibility to discuss the specific location of the 
households with inventories in the whole distribution of income and its implication for the 
selection biases affecting the surviving PIs. Before advancing in that topic, it is necessary to 
take into account that this link between the inventories and the whole distribution of 
income in Palencia is different from the one in the other two regions. In Palencia we have a 
representative sample of incomes of the whole province built by collecting information 
                                                 
21 When the occupation recorded in the EC was not indicative of the economic sector, we have assumed that 
if more than 50% of the total income comes from rural properties they belong to primary sector while when 
more than 50% of their total income comes from urban properties they belong to tertiary sector. After this 
procedure, there are still observations for which it was impossible to define an economic sector; the typical 
categories here are poor, disabled and women. For more details about the way in which the economic sector 
is assigned to each household see Nicolini and Ramos (2010). 
22 McCants (2007) uses a set of inventories from 912 poor to lower-middling citizen households from the city 
of Amsterdam and she is able to link the position of over half of the households in the whole income 
distribution using information on the monthly rental cost of their dwellings. 
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from all the relevant geographic units in the province and calculating the proper weights 
for each GU (see Nicolini and Ramos 2015). For each of the other two regions we have 
collected information in only two areas and they are not statistically representative of the 
whole provinces (and they are not intended to be). When we draw some conclusion of 
what happens in regions 2 and 3, we are talking only about what happens in those GUs for 
what we have information. 
Taking the observations from Palencia, we can compare the distribution of 
inventories (recall that they are all the available inventories of that particular geographic 
region) with the distribution of income of the related population (which is the complete list 
of households in a subset of localities which are weighted in order to obtain an 
approximation of the income distribution of the whole province). In the province of 
Palencia, only 2.6% of the inventories come from households in the first quintile and 
another 7.8 % come from the second quintile implying that the 40% in the bottom of the 
distribution contributes with only 10.4% of the total of inventories: the size of the selection 
bias is considerable. However, and despite the quite large selection bias of PIs, our 
matched data shows that people below the median income are not completely absent from 
the records of wealth; the weighted median income in DS2 is 698 reales and 23 households 
in that province in DS1 (19.8%) have income below that level implying that almost a fifth 
of the PIs come from households whose income is below the median.23 
Regarding the intra-group selection bias, and still focusing in the province of 
Palencia, the weighted average income of households below the median in our DS2 is 450 
reales while the average income of those households with PIs (our DS1) and income below 
698 reales is 545.4. If we look at the bottom of the distribution, the weighted mean income 
of the first quintile is 122.5, while the three survival inventories in that group have incomes 
of 251 and 266 and 333.5 reales.24 So below the median, the average income of the PIs is 21 
% higher than the average income in the whole population while in the first quintile the 
average income of the PIs is a 131 % higher than the average income in the whole 
population. The intra-group selection bias is not only large but it also increases as long as 
the focus moves to the bottom part of the distribution. 
                                                 
23 The share of inventories in each income group for the 194 observations in DS1 can be observed in table 1. 
In this case the bottom 40 % of the income distribution represents only the 5.1 % of the inventories of the 
sample.  
24 The upper limit income of the first quintile is 360 reales. So the average income of the two households in 
the first quintile is closer to the upper limit than to the average income of the quintile.  
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Another characteristic of the comparison of the two distributions is that the wealth 
of those very close to the bottom of the distribution is not negligible in terms of their own 
income: in Palencia the ratio wealth-to-income of households in the first two quintiles 
(14.16) is actually larger than that ratio in the whole distribution of the province of Palencia 
(11.39). If the three GU are analyzed together (without weights) this pattern is even 
stronger, the picture is that in the first two quintiles the ratio wealth-to-income is 30.46 and 
in the whole distribution is 12.67. We have to be very cautious in drawing conclusions from 
this regularity because this hypothesis can be strongly affected by within-group selection 
bias: it is highly probable that, in the bottom of the distribution, only those households 
with relatively large wealth produce an inventory and therefore the average wealth of the 
inventories in that group is larger than the average wealth of all the households in that 
group.  
Each observations in our DS1 has information on both income (from the EC) and 
wealth (from the PI) so it is possible to explore, on an individual basis, the relationship 
between income when the Cadaster was produced and wealth in the moment of the death 
of the head of the household. Graphs 1 shows this relationship with the variables in levels 
while in Graph 2 these variables are in logs. The association between them is quite 
remarkable, in particular in the second graph.  
FIGURE 3 
WEALTH AND TOTAL INCOME IN THE 194 INVENTORIES  
Graph 1 
Variables in levels  
Graph 2 
Variables in logarithms 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Trying to infer a causal relationship between income and wealth in this case is 
complex because on the one hand wealth can be regarded as the accumulated result of past 
streams of income and on the other hand income is determined, at least partially, by the 
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predetermined, it does not change significantly within a generation and therefore the 
direction of causality would go more from wealth to income than from income to wealth 
(Alfani 2010, p. 514). Anyway, we present our econometric approach more as a descriptive 
device to understand the association between the variables and the possibility to infer what 
happens with the distribution of one of the variables from the information about the other 
variable rather than an attempt to explain the behavior of one variable through 
identification of an exogenous variation of the other variable.  
In order to have a simple theoretical framework to discuss the relationship between 
the two variables, we can assume that wealth of the deceased is equal to the death of the 
living and that income is a function of wealth, we can hypothesize that  
 =  +                                                        (1) 
	 = 
 +                                                   (2)  
where  is income of household i, Y is wage, r is the rate of return TW is total wealth (as 
recorded in inventories), PW is productive wealth or wealth that produces a flow of 
economic returns (land for instance), NPW is non-productive wealth (like durable 
consumption goods) and r is the average rate of return of the productive wealth.  
In the simplest case in which the rate of return of productive assets is the same for 
every household and wages and non-productive wealth are zero, income will be a 
proportion of total wealth and inequality of income and wealth, measured by the standards 
indices (Gini among them), will be equal.25 Empirically, however, wealth inequality is always 
larger than income inequality and this could be due to several facts. One of them is that 
wages are non-zero and larger, in relative terms, in the lower part of the distribution. A 
simplification of this hypothesis is that all the households have the same labour incomes 
and is presented by Soltow and Van Zanden in their model for changes in income 
inequality (Soltow and Van Zanden 1998, pp. 49-54). Nicolini and Ramos (2015), using the 
Shorrocks decomposition (Shorrocks 1982) show that, in sample of households in Palencia 
in circa 1750, labour incomes have a positive contribution to total income inequality and 
therefore they are not equal across the distribution and they are positively correlated with 
total income (i.e. more affluent households have larger labour incomes than households in 
the bottom of the distribution).  
                                                 
25 A property of the Gini index is the independence of scale which implies that if all the incomes in a given 
distribution increase by the same proportion, the Gini does not change. 
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Another possibility is that non-productive wealth is relatively larger in the top part 
of the distribution, i.e. more affluent households have a larger share of their wealth in non-
productive assets (books, jewellery, etc.); in this case, differences in wealth across different 
parts of the distribution will be larger than differences in income. This explanation, 
although plausible has not been explored in the literature.  
If we put both income and wealth in levels and estimate  
 =  + 	 +  +                                        (3) 
where  and 	 are income and total wealth respectively while   is a set of control 
variables linked to observable economic characteristics of the household like economic 
sector or place of residence. The estimated  would be the income level when wealth is 
equal to zero (labor income in our framework above) and  would be the rate of return of 
wealth; in this case, given that inventories incorporate total wealth,  would be a 
downward biased estimation of the rate of return of productive wealth.  
As we have already discussed above in this section, the available PIs in archives 
(which are the base for our DS1) are not a random sample of the households in a particular 
geographic area because more affluent households are over-represented. In order to correct 
this selection bias we have constructed a distribution of households’ incomes for the 11 
GUs in our DS226 and, whence we had the whole distribution of incomes for our DS2, we 
have calculated the percentage of households in our DS1 that belong to each income group 
in DS2 (see Table 2). For instance, if we consider the 194 observations of the three regions 
together, there are only 10 households (out of the 194 with inventories) belonging to the 
first quintile. It implies that the poorest 20% of households left only the 2.1% of 
inventories. In the other extreme, the richest 10% of households left 39.70 % of the 
inventories. It means that households in the first decile are 37.8 times more probable of 
being included in the collection of probate inventories than people in the first quintile. In 
our econometric model, we will take into account this problem weighting each observation 
in DS1 with the ratio between the percentage of households in that quintile (20%) and the 
percentage of inventories in that quintile in DS2.27 
                                                 
26 Given that the number of observations in each GU is not proportional to its population, we have weighted 
each observation in DS2 to make the relative size of each GU in our data set proportional to its relative 
population. 
27 This is the strategy suggested by Lindert (1981) and applied by previous researchers using the information 
form PIs to calculate average wealth or wealth inequality (Hanson Jones 1982, Lindert 1986, Roine and 
Waldenström 2015). In our case, weights are less obviously necessary because we are not trying to estimate 
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TABLE 2 







9.70 4 2.1 20  264.0 
6.47 6 3.1 20 264.5 450.0 
1.49 26 13.4 20 451.5 662.5 
0.78 25 12.9 10 663.0 897.5 
1.29 15 7.7 10 898.0 1122.5 
0.47 41 21.1 10 1123.0 1808.0 
0.25 77 39.7 10 1810.0 61350.0 
 194 100.0    
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The results of the weighted regression of equation 3 are presented in table 3. The 
value of the constant is 493 reales suggesting that those with wealth close to zero would 
earn that annual wage which is what many jornaleros (day-labourers) earn.28  
TABLE 3 
LINEAR REGRESSION ESTIMATES 












Adj R-squared 0.414 
F-statistic 35.05 
N 194 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The value of beta of 0.029 (equivalent to r in equation 1), means that an increase of 
wealth of 100 monetary units is associated to an increase of income of 2.9 monetary units. 
Assuming that wealth is exogenous and causality runs from wealth to income, can be 
interpreted as an average rate of return of 2.9%. Rates of return of financial investment in 
                                                                                                                                               
those indicators but to link wealth and income; selection bias in our case would be a problem if, for instance, 
there are influential variables –in the relationship between income and wealth- in the top or in the bottom of 
the distributions. Actually, the econometric results presented in the remaining part of this section do not 
change very much when the estimations are based on un-weighted regressions. 
28 The values more frequently imputed to the occupational category of jornalero were 360 and 480 reales. 
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this period in Castile were around 3%.29 The low value can be linked to the fact that not all 
the wealth is productive as we explained above.30 Specification described in equation 3 
implies that elasticity is a function of the level of wealth.31 The wealth elasticity of income 
at the means of the two variables (and assuming the dummies equal to zero) is 0.347.32 
Even though the analysis of a linear relationship is useful, visual inspection of 
Graph 1 and the pattern of residuals suggest that a linear specification is probably not the 
best one because there is some concavity on the data. If a third order polynomial in wealth 
is used in the regression, the fit of the model improves and the implied function is clearly 
increasing and concave. In order to incorporate a non-linear relationship between the 
variables, the log-in-log specification has two theoretical appeals.33  First, it puts incomes in 
logs which is consistent with the observed empirical fact that the income distribution is 
well approximated by a log normal distribution. Second, it based on the implicit 
assumption that the wealth elasticity of income is constant which allows to compare this 
variable across different estimations in a more straightforward form.34 Additionally, if we 
accept the assumption that wages are well described by a log normal distribution, we can 
assess the relative merit of a semi-log approximation (with wages in logs and wealth in 
levels) vs. a log-log approximation (with both variables in logs) using the approach 
suggested by Davidson-McKinnon (1981); this test clearly rejects the semi-log in favour of 
the log-log approximation.35 Accordingly, we estimated an alternative specification with the 
two main variables in logs  
 = ′ + ′ + ′ +     (4) 
where  is the log of income of household i,  is the log of total wealth of household i, 
and  is a set of other household characteristics.  
                                                 
29 In Castile official interest rates decreased to 3% in 1705. In the former Crown of Aragon decreased to 3% 
with the Royal Decree (Real Pragmática) of July 6, 1750. See Yun (1987), p. 357. Anyway, there was no 
integrated public debt market for all Castile. In fact, there was a great diversity in nominal interest rates (from 
5 to 10%) offered by the juros de alcabalas in different cities as Burgos (e.g. this city was able to offer 11 types 
of different interest rates in the mid-eighteenth century), Cadiz and Murcia. See Álvarez-Nogal (2009), pp. 
129-130. 
30 If the two outliers to the right of graph 1 are excluded the slope changes to 0.049. 
31 If  =  +  the elasticity is  = 


 which is an increasing and concave function of  . 
32 If the two outliers are excluded the elasticity goes up to 0.551. 
33 Wooldrige (2002, p. 279) says that “in many cases, using logarithms of certain variables and adding 
quadratics is sufficient for detecting many important nonlinear relationships in economics.”. 
34 If we assume that the correct econometric model is a log in logs  =∝ +
where x=log(X) and 
w=log(W), we are implicitly assuming that  = 
 . This specification has a problem: it implies that 
income is zero whenever productive wealth is zero, which is probably not very reasonable. 
35 Results available under request. 
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In this case the parameter ′ can be interpreted as the percentage change in income 
associated to each percentage point increase in wealth. In this case, there is the underlying 
assumption that this elasticity is constant for the different levels of income. The results of 
the regression with the variables in logs is in table 4:  
TABLE 4 
LOG REGRESSION ESTIMATES 












Adj R-squared 0.471 
F-statistic 44.01 
N 194 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The elasticity of .579 suggests that an increase in one percentage point in wealth is 
associated to an increase of slightly more than a half a percentage point in income. The 
dummies associated to tertiary and secondary sectors are positive suggesting that for a 
given level of wealth, income is larger for households whose head is working in those 
sectors. Although we do not have an empirically backed explanation for this finding, it 
would be consistent with the idea that a higher share of wealth is “productive” in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors (for instance because land has a value as status goods but it is 
not always associated to higher incomes).36 
Given that we have observations from Palencia in the North, Guadalajara and Las 
Vegas in the Center and Granada in the South, we can check if there are systematic 
differences in the estimated relationship across regions. In table 5 we present the results of 
the regression of specification (2) for each region.37 
                                                 
36 Another possibility, more related with the characteristics of the data, is that wealth in these sectors could 
easier to conceal and therefore is systematically under-reported in PIs and therefore it seems to be more 
productive. For a discussion of possible under-reporting in the process of elaboration of a Probate Inventory 
see Nicolini and Ramos (2010, p. 156-159).  
37 In these “regional” regressions, the weights are specific for each region. 
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TABLE 5 
LOG REGRESSION ESTIMATES: REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Dependent variable: Log Income 
 Region 1: Palencia Region 2: Guadalajara city 
and Madrid 




























R-squared 0.501 0.497 0.712 
Adj R-squared 0.483 0.451 0.701 
F-statistic 27.91 10.88 66.63 
N 116 49 29 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
In the case of Palencia, wealth elasticity is quite close to the one obtained with the 
whole sample, the dummy variable associated with urban households is not significant 
(while it is negative in the whole sample), and the dummies associated to tertiary and 
secondary sectors are positive and significant.  
In region 2, the elasticity is smaller than in region 1 and the parameters associated 
to both tertiary and secondary are positive; all the estimated parameters are statistically 
significant at 5 %. The effect of being located in an urban context is negative and 
statistically significant in Region 2 but non-significant in region 1, suggesting that what 
happens in the city of Guadalajara (the only city in Region 2) is different of what happens 
in Palencia (the only city in Region 1). 
In Region 3 the only variable included in the regression is the log of wealth. This is 
because the localities included in our data set from Region 3 are mostly rural and with most 
of the head of the households engaged in activities in the primary sector (only 1 head of the 
household is engaged in secondary activities- a blacksmith- and 3 heads of the household 
are engaged in tertiary activities –an apothecary, a carriage-driver and a Regidor Perpetuo-); 
there are no urban centers in this region. The estimation of equation (2) in this case 
generates a wealth elasticity that is larger than in the other two regions: the point estimate is 
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smaller than one but the confidence interval includes values larger than one.38 In this 
region, we cannot reject the hypothesis that income and wealth increase proportionally. A 
quite remarkable feature of the results in table 5 is that in Granada, with only 29 
observations, the association between the two variables is very high with an R2 of 0.71 (and 
adjusted R2 of 0.70). 
Several features of the results deserve additional comments: first, it is remarkable 
the close association between two variables that, collected from completely independent 
sources, provide alternative perspectives on the affluence of the households. This 
association suggests that, although it is tempting to be suspicious about the precision with 
which some historical sources provide an accurate picture of the material well-being of the 
population in the past, the two variables are quite good at capturing some underlying 
dimension of that material well-being.  
A second implication of the results is that in average and in the two regions with 
more observations, the income of a household increases more slowly than its wealth. The 
limitations of our data renders impossible to provide a completely satisfactory explanation 
of this fact but it provides the possibility to discuss some hypotheses. The first one is that 
labor income (or more generally income non-related to physical assets) is relatively larger in 
the bottom part of the distribution; if this would be the case, as long as the households 
have larger wealth, their labor income decreases in relative terms producing a less-than 
proportional increase in income (vis-a-vis wealth). Figure 5 (graphs from 1 to 3) shows the 
relationship between the share of personal income in total income and total income. In 
addition to some households for which the share is zero or one (represented by the dots in 
the horizontal lines 0 and 1) it is clearly observable that the larger total income is, the 
smaller is the share of labor income.39 Graphs 2 and 3 show that this pattern is much more 
detectable in those households whose head is mainly engaged in agricultural activities than 
in households linked to activities in the secondary and tertiary sectors.  
FIGURE 4 
PERSONAL INCOME AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME 
                                                 
38 The difference of the results in Region 3 is not driven by the fact that almost all the households in Region 3 
are rural. If the equation (2) is estimated only for the rural households of the other regions the elasticity 
increases slightly (compared with the one obtained with both rural and urban households) but it is still smaller 
than one. 
39 The household with a share larger than one corresponds to Antonio de Laya, a lawyer with a personal 
income of 3,300 reales but a negative income because he had 297 reales from censos en contra. These “censos en 
contra” were the annual interest rate paid for financial liabilities. More details in Nicolini and Ramos (2015, p. 
13). 
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Graph 1: Total Graph 2: Primary sector 
Graph 3: Secondary and 
Tertiary sectors 
   
Source: Authors’s calculations. 
Another possibility is that wealth is more concentrated in income-producing assets 
in the bottom part of the distribution and more concentrated in other kind of assets (status 
goods, luxury consumption items, etc.) in the top of the distribution. Preliminary analysis 
of the participation of different kind of goods in the inventories suggests that this is the 
case: it is possible to see in Table 6 that the share of real estate (land and buildings), 
presumably income generating assets, in total wealth is clearly larger in the first quintiles 
while the shares of perishable goods and money in cash (probably not producing income) 
seem to be larger in Quintiles 4 and 5. The top quintile shows larger shares of debts in 
favor and financial assets (presumably producing some income in earned interests) and 
shop assets (presumably related to income generating activities in the tertiary sector) than 
the other parts of the distribution but these differences are not really large. 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS IN PROBATE INVENTORIES BY QUINTILES 
Concept 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Non-land properties 24.78 18.19 16.61 20.31 13.67 
Rural properties 34.23 30.84 26.96 26.96 27.60 
Money 1.38 2.96 1.79 2.65 4.63 
Debts in favor (financial assets) 5.02 1.34 3.59 3.62 6.57 
Inheritance in advance 4.02 5.59 9.08 7.77 4.17 
Shop assets 0.00 0.97 0.23 0.00 4.55 
Tools 3.38 7.18 8.53 5.09 4.72 
Perishable goods 4.87 7.77 5.84 11.01 8.33 
Raw Textiles 2.18 7.30 5.68 3.15 5.61 
Livestock 7.19 9.10 9.58 10.00 7.24 
Consumption Goods 12.93 8.86 12.10 9.44 12.92 
Wealth (mean) in reales 6,560.08 10,397.93 14,765.52 20,992.48 44,416.04 
N 24 23 23 23 23 
Note: these shares are calculated only by probate inventories (116) from Palencia province. See Ramos 
Palencia (2010). 
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A third implication is that the relation between wealth and income is not the same 
for household whose head is engaged in agriculture than for households whose head works 
in the secondary or tertiary sectors. In addition, while in some regions like Palencia urban 
households seem to have a similar relation between income and wealth than rural 
households, it is not the case in Guadalajara where urban dwellers have smaller income for 
a given wealth than rural dwellers. This could be relevant when there are comparisons of 
levels of economic inequality across sectors or regions and some proxies like real estate or 
some subsets of assets are used to proxy for wealth or income (see Van Zanden 1995 and 
Alfani 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
The estimation of economic inequality in pre-industrial economies is forced to use 
creatively indirect data. The income distribution, usually reconstructed using social tables, 
tend to be imprecise in the top part of the distribution given that the variability of income 
within an occupational category is large. Distribution of wealth, usually using fiscal sources 
or probate inventories is badly estimated in the bottom part of the distribution because of 
the important selection bias that arises from the fact that in general poor people is not 
included in this kind of records. In this paper we have combined information of both 
income and wealth form the same set of households which helps to shed some light in the 
relation between the two distributions in a context of a pre-industrial, medium size, average 
income, semi-urbanized Spanish population.  
The possibility to identify the position of each households in our data set of 
surviving probate inventories in the whole distribution of households (reconstructed using 
the Ensenada Cadaster), opens the possibility to analyze the magnitudes of the selection 
bias.40 We can confirm that survival inventories are a biased slice of the society and that 
poorer households are clearly under-represented; however, some households in the bottom 
of the distribution are represented in our data set and we suggest that the widespread idea 
that households below the median income or wealth are completely absent from the 
probate inventories samples is not correct.  
Another finding of this paper is that the income assigned by the Cadastre and the 
wealth registered in the inventories are closely associated not only in the whole sample of 
                                                 
40 In this case, the “selection” is influenced by the choices and possibilities related to the process of the 
elaboration of the inventory in the 18th century plus the fact that some inventories have not survived until 
the present.  
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194 PIs but also when the three regions considered in this study (Palencia, Guadalajara-
Madrid and Granada) are analyzed separately. This result suggest that even though the 
levels of income inequality seem to be consistently smaller than the levels of wealth 
inequality the particular location of one household in one distribution is very dependent of 
the location in the other distribution.  
The data set used in this paper suggest that the best econometric specification to 
estimate the association between the variables is when both income and wealth are in 
logarithms and the results with this specification suggest the elasticity of income with 
respect to wealth is between 0.4 and  0.9 depending on the area of Spain. It implies that if a 
household has a 10 % higher wealth, its income would be between 4 % and 9 % larger.  
An elasticity smaller than one is consistent with the usually observed fact that 
wealth inequality is larger than income inequality. The reasons behind this particular feature 
of the relationship between the two distributions in Modern Spain are not fully established 
in this paper but some hypotheses have been advanced: on the one hand, it seems that 
labor incomes are slightly larger relative to other sources of income in the bottom part of 
the distribution. On the other hand, the changes in the relative importance of the different 
components of wealth (land, livestock, buildings and urban properties, financial assets, 
money and consumption goods) across the different parts of the distribution suggest that 
those assets more clearly related with the generation of income (land) are more important 
in the bottom of the distribution.  
Finally, the parameters associated with the dummy variables SECONDARY and 
TERTIARY are positive and significant in the whole sample and in two of the three 
regions suggesting that for a given level of wealth, households whose head works in those 
sectors tend to have higher income than those engaged in activities in the primary sector. 
These systematic differences in the relationship between income and wealth across 
urbanization levels and economic sectors could be a warning about using land or real estate 
as a proxy for wealth and wealth as a proxy for income: those households whose head is 
engaged in trade or manufacturing will have more wealth than the predicted by the value of 
their real estate and more income than the predicted by their wealth.  
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